Medellín Cartel - Mafia Crime News

The Medellín Cartel (Spanish: Cártel de Medellín) was a powerful and well-organized Colombian drug cartel and terrorist organization originating from the city of Medellín, Colombia, which was founded and led by Pablo Escobar . It is often considered the first major “drug cartel” and was referred to as such; (a cartel) because the upper echelons and overall power structure of the organization are built on a partnership between multiple Colombian human traffickers operating alongside Escobar. Included were Jorge Luis Ochoa Vásquez , Fabio Ochoa Vásquez , Juan David Ochoa Vásquez , José Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha and Carlos Lehder .

Escobar’s main partner in the organization, however, was his cousin Gustavo Gaviria , who handled much of the cartel’s transportation arrangements and the more general and detailed logistics aspects of the cocaine smuggling routes and international smuggling networks, which produced at least 80% of the cocaine in the world during the crisis. Highlight. Gustavo, also known as León, also appears to have had a strong hand in the cartel’s unprecedented acts of narcoterrorism, alongside his cousin Pablo, and was considered the cartel’s second-in-command and therefore one of Colombia’s most wanted men , along with him and Escobar had pending arrest warrants from other countries where their criminal activities had spread to, such as Spain and the US. Meanwhile, Pablo Escobar’s brother Roberto Escobar acted as the organization’s accountant. The cartel was active from 1976 to 1993 in Colombia (Antioquia), Bolivia, Panama, Central America, Peru, the Bahamas, the United States (namely in cities such as Los Angeles, New York and Miami), but also in Canada.

Although Escobar began profitably smuggling contraband in the early 1970s, the true beginnings of what would eventually become the infamous mafia-like organization itself officially turned to trafficking cocaine as their main contraband in 1976 (largely with the help of Carlos Lehder and George Jung ). ) who had a major influence on the infamous socio-cultural phenomenon of the cocaine explosion of the late 1970s and early 1980s in the United States. This “boom” was clearly demonstrated by the impact of the violent street crimes that characterized Miami’s drug war, as the cartel’s smuggling operations greatly increased the overall availability and access of the drug through these newly improved markets, as well as the otherwise complicated and extensive distribution networks. . At the height of its activities, the Medellín Cartel smuggled several tons of cocaine into countries around the world every week, raking in more than $200 million in drug profits every day, or billions a year. Furthermore, the organization was known for once dominating (and expanding) the international illegal cocaine trade in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but especially in later years was also known for its use of violence for political purposes. mainly in protest against judicial extradition to the US), as evidenced by their socially burdensome and volatile asymmetric war against the Colombian state itself, mainly in the form of bombings, kidnappings, arbitrary killings of law enforcement officers and political assassinations. The victims included non-combatants or random civilians who tried to negotiate with the government through fear and unequivocal acts of terror.

At its peak (early 1980s), the Medellín Cartel was recognized as the largest drug trafficking syndicate in the world, smuggling an estimated three times as much cocaine as their main competitor, the Cali Cartel , an international drug trafficking syndicate. human trafficking organization based in the Valle del Cauca department in Colombia. However, some experts and US government officials have argued the opposite, or said that most of the data collected during this period may have been biased, as most of the national security-based focus has been on the Medellín Organization, particularly due to its more ostentatious acts of violence. and ‘vengeful’ nature.

Relations between the human trafficking organizations of Medellín and Cali

Traditionally, Pablo and the Medellín Cartel originally had a strategic alliance early on and a specific smuggling deal with the Cali Cartel “godfathers”, Gilberto Rodríguez Orejuela and Miguel Rodríguez Orejuela . This arrangement resulted in Medellín controlling the cocaine trade in Los Angeles, while Cali controlled New York City, with both agreeing to share Miami and Houston. However, a personal dispute eventually surfaced between Escobar and one of the Cali cartel leaders named Pacho Herrera over a disagreement over territory in one or more of these distribution centers. Although the two organizations had scrimmages beforehand; in 1988 (presumably after the Monaco apartment bombing), the Medellín and Cali organizations became eternal enemies, a feud that continued until Medellín’s eventual demise in 1993.

A downfall largely due to the rise of the anti-Escobar “vigilante” group known as Los Pepes , officially founded in January 1993. “Los Pepes” was a diminutive of the phrase “Perseguidos por Pablo Escobar” ( meaning: “[Those] persecuted by Pablo Escobar”). The group was largely financed by the Cali Cartel and led by brothers Carlos and Fidel Castaño, right-wing paramilitary leading commanders who were once part of the Medellín Cartel. Los Pepe’s tactics, which were stylized to mirror Escobar’s own violent methods now turned against him, and which ultimately proved instrumental in the gradual defeat of the Medellín Cartel’s rule, were further accentuated by Pablo’s accumulation of enemies within his own organization (which helped characterize the battle). formation of Los Pepes), as well as Pablo’s ongoing and brutal war against the Colombian government and US law enforcement agencies; a combination of factors that cornered Escobar in the final year of his life, along with his rapidly diminishing sphere of power as the now last and last remaining leader of his once dominant cartel.

But during the early days of their mutual alliance, before these intense conflicts; The Cali and Medellín groups each presented different philosophies on how to “improve” their situation with the authorities. While Cali’s more “businesslike” Orejuela brothers sought to resolve such legal issues through corruption, Escobar instead sought to do so primarily through violence and intimidation. Especially when his (often minimal) attempts to bribe officials were not immediately accepted. Escobar and the Medellín crew in particular also acquired a unique reputation in their earlier days for killing not only those who crossed them, but often their immediate or other relatives as well, unless otherwise specified, such as when Pablo’s enemies “changed themselves” . in” rather than fleeing the region or advocating for protection from the authorities (many of whom had already been compromised). This method of “web violence” resulting from one person’s mistakes against Escobar was reportedly explained directly to American smuggler George Jung when he first met Pablo in 1978, after witnessing a man being punched in the chest was shot after he ‘voluntarily’ gave himself up to Escobar. on the knowledge that the man’s entire family would be killed if he didn’t.

While Pablo Escobar seemingly saw fear through violence and extortion (threats) as an effective motivator and an easier measure, Cali leader Gilberto mainly believed that violence should only be used as a last resort as it is generally bad for business because of the practical consequences. understand that; “dead people don’t pay what they owe.” The leaders of the Cali Cartel even required their employees to fill out “application forms”; clarifying their personal information, not necessarily for the purpose of threats, but rather for the purposes of thorough background checks and security. This included not only names and addresses of Cali Cartel hopefuls, but also financial assets and personal belongings such as cars. The Orejuela brothers wanted to be seen as “the Kennedys of Colombia,” while Escobar also dreamed of one day becoming president of the nation. However, when this failed due to scandals surrounding his criminal reputation, Escobar then embarked on a brutal move; A nearly decade-long terrorist campaign against the government, from April 1984, starting with the assassination of Rodrigo Lara Bonilla (the Colombian Justice Minister who favored extradition), to April 1993 with the massive 440-pound bomb explosion in the busy shopping center Center 93 in Bogota. the city’s popular 15th Avenue district.

History

Cocaine Trafficking in Latin America in the 1960s
In the 1960s, Colombia was not yet perceived or stereotyped as a conventional geophysical corridor for the world’s cocaine trade, as it appears to have been for the marijuana trade at the time. By the late 1960s, Colombia’s marijuana trade was the result of booming production in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta and the Urabá Peninsula, where it was then smuggled in hidden northern shipments of bananas. Allegedly when it came to the international cocaine trade in the 1960s; Argentina, Brazil and Chile were the countries with the largest hand in the international cocaine trade. Rio de Janeiro (Brazil), Buenos Aires (Argentina), and Valparaiso (Chile) served as some of the most common starting points for the maritime smuggling routes of the 1960s, while Havana, Cuba was commonly used as an intermediate transshipment point to the north. It then went to locations such as Panama City, Florida or Barcelona, Spain, both of which regularly served as final destinations for the international shipment of cocaine or other related contraband from South America. However, Cartagena, Colombia and Miami, Florida still seemed to play a modest role. However, marijuana was still said to dominate the shipment loads traveling through these routes at the time.[6] Therefore, the prevalence of cocaine remained largely under the radar at the time, because in the United States, although cocaine use steadily increased during the 1960s, it was still only marginally – moderately more popular compared to the relative magnitude of its prevalence during the 1960s . The 1950s, when cocaine use was believed to be at an all-time low and essentially considered by many to be “a problem of the past.”

Colombian smugglers and Chileans (1972–1976)

Unlike his law-abiding parents, Escobar began a life of crime early on; stealing gravestones from cemeteries, sanding the gravestones to make them appear unused, reselling them, stealing cars, kidnapping people for ransom; including at one point a wealthy businessman before eventually settling into the criminal occupation known as contraband, which at the time characterized much and subcultural domain of Colombia’s criminal underworld. This is presumably set at a time when his gang-like organizational skills and his penchant for criminal extortion appear to have converged in what was now the early 1970s in Medellín, Colombia. Escobar would go on to profit from Colombia’s prolific and growing marijuana trade, as well as the apparent smuggling and illegal trade in cigarettes. There are several claims that he was allegedly a notable figure in the so-called “Marlboro Wars” in the region; an apparently violent series of scrimmages or conflicts over control of Colombia’s illegal cigarette smuggling market. This implied that he was preparing his sensitivities on street crime and violent black market schemes for what would later come out in a much more organized and violent manner.

In 1973, there was a military coup in Chile that led to a strong crackdown on Chilean drug traffickers. This caused some drug traffickers to flee the country and/or immediately use different smuggling routes. This often resulted in Chilean traders turning their eyes to Colombia to use as a trade route further north. Around the same time, the prevalence and social acceptance of contraband in Colombia reached record highs.

Late 1970s – early 1980s

In the mid-1970s, particularly around 1975 and 1976, the illegal cocaine trade began to become a growing and significant problem for U.S. law enforcement as the drug’s prevalence began to skyrocket in unexpected ways. Initially, the first phase of substantial popularity growth in the entertainment industry began in Hollywood, before quickly spreading to other major hotspots such as Miami.

Due to cocaine’s socially prestigious reputation as a high-status cultural symbol, especially as it was linked to wealth and glamor among Americans in the late 1970s (especially due to its high cost), Colombian criminals, who were already experienced smugglers of various goods via the black market, Trafficking networks began to see cocaine as an irresistibly lucrative means of smuggling. A product like cocaine, which is ‘tighter packaged’ than other types of drugs or contraband, indicated a greater, easier potential for logistical transportability, with less chance of interdiction or complications during the product’s long journey across borders and to different destinations. regional markets Worldwide. This further maximized the profit potential of the drug, as its volume and weight relative to its final monetary value were now exponentially greater compared to trading the same or similar weight and volume of a less valuable product such as marijuana. Furthermore, unlike marijuana, which can be produced in close proximity to sought-after North American drug markets, cocaine production at the time was virtually exclusive to South America and therefore easier to control and monopolize for regional criminal groups.

During this time, many of the most established, enterprising, and capable smugglers or human trafficking groups were made up of Colombian nationals. But even among them, the soon-to-be enormously wealthy drug lord Pablo Escobar stood out from the rest. Escobar was characterized by his strategy of providing protection to other traffickers who worked with him and helped further distribute the organization’s cocaine to high-demand markets such as New York City and eventually Miami. So after forming a larger and more formidable web of suppliers and combined trading networks that continually strengthened the activities of Escobar and his cousin, made possible by a newly formed, mutually beneficial partnership between several drug traffickers now working together (hence the term cartel), at its peak, moving about 2,500 to 3,500 pounds per day.

The criminal power structure already present within Pablo and Gustavo’s previous, informal organization or smuggling ring rose to prominence as a result of cocaine’s unusually high profit margins; even after only a brief exposure to the North American market and its distribution channels, the organization’s influence over the global cocaine trade increased dramatically, which was of course followed by unprecedented amounts of wealth. The then “cartel-like” model for Pablo and Gustavo’s criminal organization began to blossom between 1976 and 1979, when it also included the contraband smuggling networks of the Ochoas ( Jorge Luis Ochoa Vásquez , Fabio Ochoa Vásquez and Juan David Ochoa Vásquez), as well as the human trafficking and muscle (armed men) who worked under José Gonzalo Rodríguez Gacha; nicknamed “the Mexican”, and the eccentric German Colombian figure Carlos Lehder, who initially worked with the infamous American smuggler George Jung or “Boston George”, with whom he was dormmates in the prison of the Federal Correctional Institution, Danbury, where Jung was incarcerated at the same time as Lehder on charges of trafficking in marijuana.

Before this, Escobar’s initial smuggling ring consisted of small gangs of hired gunmen on his payroll and was merely a precursor to the final and full-fledged massive criminal organization that became known as the Medellín Cartel. Once these aforementioned drug lords stepped in to combine their smuggling power and capabilities, and after the ever-growing demand for their product in the North American market began to be recognized, the term cartel came into the picture, even though they did not originally refer to themselves as such. The term cartel, in reference to the mercantile nature of this now expanding Colombian drug trafficking oligopoly, appears to have been first coined by the US State Department to distinguish these higher level criminal organizations from the traditional, medium-sized gangs. often associated with drug trafficking. Ultimately, as the cartel label became a household name, it was later embraced by the organization in later years. This economic control, which resulted from the unification of the power structures of once separate groups, gave way to a kind of financial positive feedback loop, with further profits after the initial expansion of the Medellín Cartel leading to even greater levels of power and growth, leading to even greater profits. more profit in the process.

Carlos Lehder and George Jung (1976-1978)

Jung described Danbury Prison in Connecticut as a “medium-low security prison” that was “full of mafia guys.” He further points out the “irony” (probably due to his marijuana charges) that he was assigned as a dormmate to Colombian Carlos Lehder who was serving a sentence for stealing cars and shipping them to South America. They casually discussed their accusations, with Jung saying he had been caught flying marijuana from Mexico; Lehder responded by asking him if he “knew anything about cocaine.” He did not do so at the time, but immediately became entranced when Lehder continued: “You know it costs $60,000 per kilo.” A proclamation that served Jung as a convincing sales pitch; they both waited until they were released before trying to get involved in the cocaine trade.

While trapped together, Jung helped Lehder by giving him valuable input and tips on how to smuggle drugs effectively. Jung had extensive knowledge in this area from his previous experiences flying marijuana shipments across international borders – from Mexico to the US, and within the US, from California to New England. However, Lehder could also benefit Jung once they were both released from prison by introducing him to Colombia’s most powerful drug smuggler: Pablo Escobar. This would prove useful to Jung in the future, when he and Lehder later fell out and no longer did business together.

By 1976, both men were out of prison (Jung was released shortly after Lehder). Lehder’s behavior became increasingly erratic, supposedly “crazy” and “megalomaniac,” in the last two or three years of the 1970s, and increased further in the early 1980s. By the end of the decade (around 1978), Lehder had betrayed Jung. Lehder did this by trying to push Jung out of the company and began setting up his own large cocaine transshipment operation for Escobar and the Medellín Organization on an island in the Bahamas called Norman’s Cay. Here Lehder would adopt an unconventional, hedonistic, drug-fueled lifestyle after getting the island’s residents to leave the island, either by force or bribery. Jung tried to avoid Lehder from then on, so he simply went back to Colombia to meet Escobar directly, setting up a new, but now more modest, smuggling project. This would continue to operate under Escobar’s network, as the two still had a good relationship, and Escobar was able to use Lehder directly as a reliable connection for acquiring significant quantities of South American powdered cocaine.

Both Jung and Lehder made millions of dollars, not only for themselves, but also for the cartel, from their highly successful cocaine distribution operation, which may have arguably been a factor in kick-starting America’s cultural “cocaine age”; The emergence of this cultural phenomenon noticeably coincided with the beginning of Jung and Lehder’s involvement in cocaine distribution. Despite their incredibly profitable smuggling operation, it only lasted from roughly 1976 to 1978. In this short period, however, they were able to create a historically unprecedented drug trafficking operation that proved invaluable to the overall initial rise of Escobar and the Medellín Cartel to the largest smuggling organization. leading cocaine company. Both Jung and Lehder were in the unique position of not only being present during the very early days of the Medellín smuggling conglomerate, which later spawned the cartel, but both in many ways being directly responsible for its accelerated growth during its inception. Although Escobar and the others were very capable and ingenious smugglers, they still technically did not have a large market in the United States or a major transportation system for their product. It was Jung and Lehder who effectively provided this.

From independent smuggling gang to collaborative cartel (1976-1979)

Pablo Escobar and his cousin Gustavo’s mid-1970s newly transformed trading operation aimed at moving cocaine powder into America after first fully ascertaining the indispensable distribution network capabilities and other logistical elements that both Carlos Lehder and George Jung could facilitate for the sale of their product in the current time. The major emerging markets were about to undergo a different kind of expansion. After running their new cocaine operations with this extensive distribution system, it quickly led to the two cousins (Pablo and Gustavo) amassing a staggering amount of wealth in such a short period of time (mainly thanks to Jung and Lehder), that their other compatriots criminal acquaintances who were already notable regional figures in the smuggling world, such as José Rodriguez Gacha and the Ochoas who were not yet part of the organization but began to more seriously consider becoming involved with the two cousins and the cocaine trade eventually entered the shot .

At this point, Pablo and Gustavo combined the increasing power and wealth of their sole “independent” smuggling gang into a conglomerate consisting of the multiple aforementioned smuggling gangs linked together in a cooperative manner to give the overall organization a stronger backbone. structural apparatus by allowing Gacha and the Ochoas to link and synergize the relative spheres of power of their own smuggling networks with Escobar’s, thus maximizing and concentrating their power rather than keeping it divided. After seeing the results of Pablo and Gustavo’s impressive profit and success figures (who now surpassed the Ochoas), they soon began to prioritize the smuggling of cocaine over virtually all other forms of ‘goods’ and contraband, such as commodities. which they had already benefited from in recent years.

Cocaine explosion in the 1980s

This lucrative and newly discovered extensive network of human traffickers then began to creatively utilize many new methods to get their cocaine product into the US; implementing more ingenuity and new strategies in smuggling logistics. This ranged from cocaine-filled hollow pellets, multi-layered condoms or balloons that are then swallowed by mules[6] to pass through customs or international borders without detection (particularly in commercial air transport), to large quantities loaded onto Cessnas; these have now been recognized over the years as a favored method for smugglers due to their ability to fly slowly, allowing for more precise deliveries to drop zones. Some smuggling strategies also reportedly involved diverting law enforcement attention from one smuggled shipment of cocaine to smuggle in an even larger quantity when authorities’ attention and associated interdiction resources were diverted or compromised. These rapid and clever innovations in illegal drug trafficking techniques by increasingly well-financed organized crime groups; such as Escobar and his Medellín associates proved to be too much for US law enforcement to effectively catch up or contain, especially as the price of cocaine dropped in 1980 and became even more popular and now among a much broader demographic group rather than usually just the prosperous country as it was in the late 1970s. This would inevitably result in the manifestation of widespread cocaine use and cultural normalization, simultaneous crime waves in almost all major US cities, as well as small “drug wars” in the increasingly relevant transshipment areas or cities like Miami (see: Miami drug war). ) and in the ghettos of Los Angeles (see: Freeway Ricky Ross). Therefore, by the turn of the century it was no longer just a drug of the sybaritic and wealthy, despite still being a cultural status symbol of class and wealth in the early 1980s.

The era of the “cocaine boom” in the United States enriched Colombian traffickers and catapulted them to enormous levels of profit and wealth that now amounted to billions of dollars, mainly in the form of cash. During the height of the cartel, Escobar oversaw the importation of large shipments of coca paste from Andean countries such as Peru and Bolivia into Colombia, where it was then processed into cocaine in jungle laboratories, as in the case of Tranquilandia, before being flown to the United States . United States in quantities up to 15 tons per day at some points.

A U.S. Marshals deputy who seized smuggled cocaine in the 1980s.
In 1982, cocaine surpassed coffee as the top Colombian export (see: Coffee Production in Colombia). Around this time, in the early 1980s, kidnappings by guerrilla groups led the state to collaborate with criminal groups such as those formed by Escobar and the Ochoas. The kidnapping of Carlos Lehder and the 1981 kidnapping of the Ochoas’ sister; Martha Ochoa, which led to the creation of cartel-funded private armies created to combat guerrillas who attempted to redistribute their land to local farmers, kidnap them, or extort the gramaje money that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas) Revolucionarias de Colombia or FARC) tried to steal.

“Death to Kidnappers” (1981)

In late 1981 and early 1982, members of the Medellín Cartel, the Cali Cartel, the Colombian military, the US-based company Texas Petroleum, the Colombian legislature, small industrialists, and wealthy ranchers came together in a series of meetings. in Puerto Boyacá and formed a paramilitary organization known as Muerte a Secuestradores (“Death to Kidnappers”, MAS) to defend their economic interests and to provide protection for local elites against kidnappings and extortion. By 1983, Colombian internal affairs had recorded 240 political assassinations by MAS death squads, mainly community leaders, elected officials and peasants.

The following year, the Asociación Campesina de Ganaderos y Agricultores del Magdalena Medio (“Association of Ranchers and Farmers of Central Magdalena”, ACDEGAM) was founded to handle both the logistics and public relations of the organization, and to provide a legal front for various paramilitary groups. ACDEGAM worked to promote anti-labor policies and threatened anyone involved in organizing for labor or peasant rights. The threats were backed by the MAS, which would attack or kill anyone suspected of being a “subversive” person. ACDEGAM also built schools with the aim of creating a “patriotic and anti-communist” educational environment, and built roads, bridges and health clinics. Paramilitary recruitment, weapons stockpiling, communications, propaganda and medical services had all disappeared from ACDEGAM headquarters.

By the mid-1980s, ACDEGAM and MAS had experienced significant growth. In 1985, Pablo Escobar began funneling large amounts of cash into the organization to pay for equipment, training and weapons. The money for social projects was cut off and used to strengthen the MAS. Modern combat rifles, such as the AKM, FN FAL, Galil, and HK G3, were purchased from the military, INDUMIL, and drug-financed private sales. The organization had computers and operated a communications center that worked with the state telecommunications agency. They had 30 pilots and an assortment of fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. British, Israeli and American military instructors were hired to teach in paramilitary training centers.

Mid-late 1980s

After this time, in the mid-1980s, Escobar’s hold on Medellín further increased when he founded a criminal debt collection service known as the “Oficina de Envigado” (The Office), which was considered their first “oficina de cobro” (debt collection service). . . This was an actual physical office in the town hall of Envigado, a small municipality next to Medellín where Escobar grew up. Escobar used the municipal office to collect debts owed to him by other drug traffickers and set up the “sicarios” or hired killers for those who refused. Escobar was known to flaunt his wealth and was on Forbes’ list of billionaires for seven years, between 1987 and 1993. His luxurious estate ‘Hacienda Nápoles’, worth millions of dollars, had its own zoo and was reportedly at it is made of solid gold tableware. . Escobar was known for investing profits from the drug trade in luxury goods, real estate and works of art. He is also said to have stashed his money in “hidden coves,” reportedly burying it on his farms and under the floors of many of his homes.

“The Extraditions” (1984)

Death of Pablo Escobar (December 1993)

After a long, drawn-out manhunt that lasted many months; on December 2, 1993, Escobar was finally found with only one bodyguard at his side; Limón (Alvaro de Jesús Agudelo), who was also his old driver. They were found in a house in a middle-class residential area of his hometown Medellín (Carrera 79B No. 45D – 94, Los Olivos neighborhood) by Colombian special forces allegedly using United States tracking technology. This was a direct result of Escobar the day before; on his 44th birthday (Wednesday), he called from hiding to his family who were being protected by the government in a luxury hotel in the country’s capital, Bogota. This was also just after the family had returned from a failed attempt to travel by plane and seek refuge in Germany. Authorities relied on the traceable data of the hotel that received Escobar’s call and began using an electronic tracking system to determine the geographic location where the call originated. At that point, Escobar, who witnesses said now had a long beard, had apparently been hiding there for almost six weeks. After some initial troubleshooting, both the drug lord and Limón were eventually located the next day. Police attempted to arrest Escobar upon arrival, but the situation quickly escalated into gunfire. By the time Pablo and Limón escaped through the inside of the building and tried to avoid the authorities on a tiled terracotta roof, Limón was quickly shot and killed. Moments later, Escobar himself was shot and killed as he continued to try to evade the pursuing officers while still running across the roof to escape. He was hit by bullets in the torso and feet, and a bullet that hit him in the ear and killed him.

However, this has sparked debate as to whether he committed suicide or was actually shot dead by Colombian authorities, with his son Sebastián Marroquín (formerly Juan Pablo Escobar) still believing to this day that he shot himself because of the attitude of the police. bullet’s entry wound behind his ear that his father apparently would have targeted if he were trying to kill himself. Escobar’s main goal in an ending scenario like this was simply to not allow himself to be captured alive and suffer the rest of his life in the American prison system through extradition, or to be captured and tortured as he did to so many others. Escobar’s legacy remains controversial; Although many denounce the heinous nature of his crimes and terrorism, he was still seen as a ‘Robin Hood-like’ figure for many in Colombia as he provided many benefits such as financing infrastructure and housing for the poor, especially in barrios. in the areas surrounding Medellín. His death was mourned and his funeral was attended by more than 25,000 people. Furthermore, his private estate, Hacienda Nápoles, was eventually turned into a theme park. His life as a major cocaine trafficker and incredibly wealthy criminal (bandido) has been widely dramatized in films and has served as inspiration for pop cultural references and the retelling of his harrowing story as a prominent drug lord in both television, books and music.

Political Relations
During the later years of the Cold War, the number of left-wing guerrillas in Latin America skyrocketed. The conflicts between them and right-wing paramilitary groups and dictatorships, largely supported by the CIA, left the cartel looking for new allies while forcing it to become involved in corruption outside Colombia for political protection.

Relations with the Colombian Government
Once U.S. authorities became aware of “questionable activities,” the group was placed under the supervision of the Federal Drug Task Force. Evidence was collected, collated, and presented to a grand jury, resulting in indictments, arrests, and prison sentences for those convicted in the United States. However, as a result of these operations, very few Colombian cartel leaders were actually taken into custody. Typically, non-Colombians who conspired with the cartel were the “fruits” of these indictments in the United States.

Most of the Colombians targeted, as well as those named in such indictments, lived and stayed in Colombia or fled before the indictments were revealed. By 1993, however, most if not all of the cartel’s fugitives had been captured or located and shot dead by the Colombian National Police, trained and assisted by specialized military units and the CIA.

The last of Escobar’s lieutenants to be murdered was Juan Diego Arcila Henao, who had been released from a Colombian prison in 2002 and had been hidden in Venezuela to avoid the revenge of “Los Pepes.” However, he was shot and killed in his Jeep Cherokee in April 2007 as he left the parking lot of his home in Cumaná, Venezuela.

While it is widely believed that Los Pepes played a major role in the murder of the cartel’s members over the past 21 years, it is still questionable whether the mantle is merely a screen designed to cover up the political repercussions of both the Colombian as the Colombian government. The involvement of the US governments in these murders.

Relations with the CIA
The Kerry Committee report had concluded that the CIA provided the Contras with the political protection to smuggle cocaine into the US, as the money from these operations was used in the fight against the Sandinista government. The same report also disclosed that Juan Matta-Ballesteros, the link between the Medellin cartel and that of Guadalajara and responsible for most of the cocaine logistics from Colombia to Mexico, collaborated with the Contras and supplied weapons, general supplies and the cocaine himself – this leads to the conclusion that the cocaine supplied to the Contras was the product of the Medellin cartel.

Things started to change after the report was published, when the CIA was forced to save face in the scandal. The agency blamed Colombian guerrillas for cocaine smuggling and investigated links between the Medellin Cartel and left-wing organizations, which turned Colombia’s right-wing paramilitaries against the Medellin Cartel and helped form the Los Pepes death squad. This would also allow the CIA to participate more directly in the Colombian armed conflict.

Another move by the CIA to clean up its image was to withdraw support for Manuel Noriega, who was prosecuted between 1989 and 1990 for conspiracy to engage in drug trafficking activities. The CIA, once one of Noriega’s allies, was one of the masterminds of Operation Just Cause, which effectively ended Noriega’s tenure and led to his arrest. The end of the Panamanian connection was one of the hardest blows to the cartel operations, accelerating its decline.

Relations with the Nicaraguan government
Carlos Lehder’s Norman’s Cay strategy was abandoned in 1982 after the Bahamian government began pursuing the drug trade. Therefore, Central America was the route the cartel chose to reach the US. In 1985, the DEA, aware of Barry Seal’s ties to both the Medellin cartel, had the pilot take photographs of the cartel’s landing stripes in Nicaragua. The DEA’s previous investigation revealed that the cartel had the protection of the FSLN, the Sandinista party, to use Nicaragua as a “warehouse” for the Matta-Ballesteros logistics operation for both the Medellin and Guadalajara cartels.

The cartel knew of Seal’s activities as a DEA informant and put him under contract, killing him in February 1986. On March 16 of that same year, during a nationally televised address, United States President Ronald Reagan used surveillance footage taken on Seal’s undercover mission in which Escobar, Gacha, Nicaraguan government official Federico Vaughan, and several other men loaded a plane with cocaine.

Relations with the Panamanian government
Following the arrest of Manuel Noriega, the DEA and FBI received several tips linking the former dictator to the Medellin cartel. The Nicaraguan and Colombian conflicts in remote areas could make both countries unsafe to operate, and the cartel was looking for new places to use as staging areas. Manuel Noriega, in exchange for bribes and a share of the profits, agreed to use Panama as a new stopover for cartel logistics. Also, the ties between him and the cartel ensured that Panama could be a hideout for the group’s leadership and that the government would ignore their money laundering operations in the country.

The CIA turned a blind eye to the link between the Medellin Cartel and Noriega, as he pursued an aggressive anti-communist policy. However, the agency stopped supporting Noriega after his ties to the cartel became public.

Relations with the Cuban Government
During the 1980s decade, the decline and subsequent end of Soviet subsidies nearly wiped out the Cuban economy. During the Manuel Noriega ruling, Carlos Lehder, the cartel member charged with ensuring the cocaine reached Florida, testified that since drug smuggling to the U.S. generated billions of dollars, Cuban intelligence helped manage Nicaraguan operations and that the government of island agreed to Cuba as one of the stops for the cartel. This was done with the knowledge of the Castro brothers, with the younger one, Raúl Castro, meeting Lehder.

Fear of Extradition
Perhaps the greatest threat to the Medellín Cartel and the other traffickers was the implementation of an extradition treaty between the United States and Colombia. This allowed Colombia to extradite any Colombian suspected of drug trafficking to the US to be tried for their crimes. This was a major problem for the cartel, as the drug traffickers had little access to their local power and influence in the US, and a trial there would most likely lead to prison time. Among the staunch supporters of the extradition treaty were Colombian Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara (who pushed for more action against the drug cartels), police officer Jaime Ramírez and numerous Colombian Supreme Court judges.

However, the cartel employed a “bend or break” strategy on several of these followers, using bribery, extortion or violence. Nevertheless, as the police effort began to cause major losses, some of the major drug lords themselves were temporarily expelled from Colombia, forcing them into hiding, where they ordered cartel members to eliminate key supporters of the extradition treaty.

The cartel has issued death threats to Supreme Court judges and asked them to cancel the extradition treaty. The warnings were ignored. This led Escobar and the group he called Los Extraditables (“The Extraditables”) to launch a violent campaign to pressure the Colombian government by committing a series of kidnappings, murders and narco-terrorist acts.

Alleged relationship with the M-19
In November 1985, 35 heavily armed members of the guerrilla group M-19 stormed the Colombian Supreme Court in Bogotá, leading to the siege of the Palace of Justice. Some claimed at the time that the cartel’s influence was behind the M-19 raid, due to its interest in intimidating the Supreme Court. Others argue that the alleged cartel-guerrilla relationship was unlikely to occur at that time because the two organizations had had several standoffs and confrontations, such as M-19’s kidnappings of drug lord Carlos Lehder and of Marta Nieves Ochoa, Juan’s sister . David Ochoa. These kidnappings led to the creation of the paramilitary group MAS/Muerte a Secuestradores (“Death to Kidnappers”) by Pablo Escobar. Former guerrilla members have also denied that the cartel had any part in this event. The issue continues to be debated within Colombia.

Murders
As a means of intimidation, the cartel committed thousands of assassinations throughout the country. Escobar and his associates made it clear that anyone who opposed them would risk being killed along with their families. Some estimates place a total of around 3,500 deaths during the height of the cartel’s activities, including more than 500 police officers in Medellín, but it is impossible to compile the entire list due to the limitations of the judiciary in Colombia. The following is a short list of the most infamous murders committed by the cartel:

Luis Vasco and Gilberto Hernandez, two DAS agents who arrested Pablo Escobar in 1976. One of the cartel’s first assassinations of authorities.
Rodrigo Lara, Minister of Justice, was killed on April 30, 1984 on a highway in Bogotá, when two armed men on a motorcycle approached his vehicle in traffic and opened fire.
Tulio Manuel Castro Gil, judge superior who investigated Escobar for the murder of two DAS agents who arrested Escobar and his cousin Gustavo Gaviria in 1977 , murdered by motorcycle gunmen in July 1985, shortly after they indicted Escobar.
Hernando Baquero Borda, Supreme Court Justice; rapporteur and defender of the extradition treaty with the United States, murdered by armed men in Bogotá on 31 July 1986.
Jaime Ramírez Gómez, police colonel and head of the anti-narcotics unit of the National Police of Colombia. Killed near Fontibon on the way to Bogota on November 17, 1986, when assassins in a green Renault 18 drove up next to his red Mitsubishi Montero and opened fire. Ramírez died instantly; his wife and two sons were unharmed.
Guillermo Cano Isaza, director of El Espectador who publicly exposed Escobar’s criminal past, was murdered in Bogotá on December 17, 1986 by armed men riding a motorcycle.
Jaime Pardo Leal, presidential candidate and head of the Patriotic Union party, murdered by a gunman in October 1987.
Carlos Mauro Hoyos, Attorney General, was kidnapped and then murdered by gunmen in Medellín in January 1988.
Antonio Roldan Betancur, governor of Antioquia, was killed by a car bomb in July 1989.
Waldemar Franklin Quintero, commander of the Antioquia police, murdered by gunmen in Medellín in August 1989.
Luis Carlos Galán, presidential candidate, killed by gunmen during a rally in Soacha in August 1989. The killing took place on the same day that the commander of the Antioquia police was shot by the cartel.
Carlos Ernesto Valencia, Judge Superior, murdered by gunmen shortly after indicting Escobar for the death of Guillermo Cano, in August 1989.
Jorge Enrique Pulido, journalist, director of Jorge Enrique Pulido TV, murdered by armed men in Bogotá in November 1989.
Diana Turbay, journalist, editor-in-chief of the magazine Hoy por Hoy and the daughter of former President Julio César Turbay Ayala, murdered by the Colombian army during a rescue attempt in January 1991. Actually, the bullet found in her body came from a police helicopter.
Enrique Low Murtra, Minister of Justice, murdered by gunmen in central Bogotá in May 1991.
Myriam Rocio Velez, Judge Superior, murdered by gunmen shortly before she was to sentence Escobar for Galán’s murder, in September 1992.
Miguel Maza Márquez was the target of the DAS bombing of buildings, killing 52 civilians caught up in the blast. Miguel escaped unharmed.

In 1993, shortly before Escobar’s death, cartel lieutenants were also targeted by the vigilante group Los Pepes (or PEPES, People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar).

After the assassination of Juan Diego Arcila Henao in 2007, most if not all of Escobar’s lieutenants who were not in prison had been killed by Colombia’s National Police Search Bloc (trained and assisted by American Delta Force and CIA operatives). , or by the Los Angeles Force. Pepe’s vigilantes.

DEA agents believed that their four-pronged “Kingpin Strategy,” which specifically targeted top cartel figures, was a major factor contributing to the organization’s collapse.

Legacy
La Oficina de Envigado is believed to be a partial successor to the Medellín organization. It was founded by Don Berna as an enforcement wing for the Medellín Cartel. When Don Berna fell out with Escobar, La Oficina arranged for Escobar’s rivals to drive Escobar out. The organization subsequently inherited Medellín’s turf and its criminal connections in the US, Mexico and Britain, and began aligning itself with Colombia’s paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces, organizing drug trafficking operations on their behalf.